We examine the profitability and implications of online discount vouchers, a new marketing tool that offers consumers large discounts when they prepay for participating merchants' goods and services. Within a model of repeat experience good purchase, we examine two mechanisms by which a discount voucher service can benefit affiliated merchants: price discrimination and advertising. For vouchers to provide successful price discrimination, the valuations of consumers who have access to vouchers must systematically differ from-and be lower than-those of consumers who do not have access to vouchers. Offering vouchers is more profitable for merchants which are patient or relatively unknown, and for merchants with low marginal costs. Extensions to our model accommodate the possibilities of multiple voucher purchases and merchant price re-optimization.
Introduction
A variety of web sites now sell discount vouchers for services as diverse as restaurants, skydiving, and museum visits. To consumers, discount vouchers promise substantial savings-often 50% or more. To merchants, discount vouchers offer opportunities for price discrimination as well as exposure to new customers and online "buzz." Best known among voucher vendors is Chicago-based Groupon, a two-year-old startup already touting a ten-digit valuation and, purportedly, recently rejecting a $6 billion acquisition offer from Google (Surowiecki (2010) ). Hundreds of websites offer discount schemes similar to that of Groupon.
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The rise of discount vouchers presents many intriguing questions: Who is liable if a merchant goes bankrupt after issuing vouchers but before performing its service? What happens if a merchant simply refuses to provide the promised service? Since vouchers entail prepayment of funds by consumers, do buyers enjoy the consumer protections many states provide for gift certificates (such as delayed expiration and the right to a cash refund when value is substantially used)? Must consumers using vouchers remit tax on merchants' ordinary menu prices, or is tax due only on the voucher-adjusted prices consumers actually pay? What prevents consumers from printing multiple copies of a discount voucher and redeeming those copies repeatedly?
To merchants considering whether to offer discount vouchers, the most important question is the basic economics of the offer: Can providing large voucher discounts actually be profitable? Voucher discounts are worthwhile if they predominantly attract new customers who regularly return, paying full price on future visits. But if vouchers prompt many long-time customers to use discounts, offering vouchers could reduce profits. For most merchants, the effects of offering vouchers lie between these extremes: vouchers bring in some new customers, but also provide discounts to some regular customers. In this paper, we offer a model to explore how consumer demographics and offer details interact to shape the profitability of voucher discounts. We illustrate two mechanisms by which a discount voucher service can benefit affiliated merchants. First, discount vouchers can facilitate price discrimination, allowing merchants to offer distinct prices to different consumer populations. In order for voucher offers to yield profitable price discrimination, the consumers who are offered the voucher discounts must be more price-sensitive (with regards to participating merchants' goods or services) than the population as a whole. Second, discount vouchers can benefit merchants through advertising, by informing consumers of a merchant's existence. For these advertising effects to be important, a merchant must begin with sufficiently low recognition among prospective consumers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review the related literature in Section 2. We present our model of voucher discounts in Section 3, exploring price discrimination and advertising effects. In Section 4, we extend our model to consider the possibility of consumers purchasing multiple vouchers and of merchants adjusting prices in anticipation of voucher usage. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss implications of our results for merchants and voucher services.
Related Literature
The recent proliferation of voucher discount services has garnered substantial press: a multitude of newspaper articles and blog posts, and even a short feature in The New Yorker (Surowiecki (2010) ). However, voucher discounts have received little attention in the academic literature.
To our knowledge, the only prior academic study of online voucher discounts is the survey work of Dholakia (2010) . In that work, Dholakia (2010) polls businesses that offered Groupon discounts. Echoing sentiments expressed in the popular press, 2 Dholakia (2010) finds mixed empirical results: some business owners speak glowingly of Groupon, while others regret their voucher promotions. Unlike the survey approach of Dholakia (2010) , we seek to understand voucher discount economics on a theoretical level. Our results indicate that voucher discounts are naturally good fits for certain types of merchants, and poor fits for others; these theoretical observations can help us interpret the range of reactions to Groupon and similar services.
Although there is little academic work on voucher discounts, a well-established literature explores the advertising and pricing of experience goods, i.e. goods for which some characteristics cannot be observed prior to consumption (Nelson (1970 (Nelson ( , 1974 ).
The parsimonious framework of Bils (1989) , upon which we base our model, studies how prices of experience goods respond to shifts in demand. Bils (1989) assumes that consumers know their conditional valuations for a firm's goods, but do not know whether that firm's goods "fit" until they have tried them.
3 Analyzing overlapping consumer generations, Bils (1989) measures the tradeoff between attracting more first-time consumers and extracting surplus from returning consumers.
Meanwhile, much of the work on experience goods concerns issues of information asymmetry: if a merchant's quality is unknown to consumers but known to the merchant, then advertising (Nelson (1974); Milgrom and Roberts (1986) ), introductory offers (Shapiro (1983); Milgrom and Roberts (1986) ; Bagwell (1990) ), or high initial pricing (Bagwell and Riordan (1991) ; Judd and Riordan (1994) ) can provide signals of quality. Of this literature, the closest to our subject is the work on introductory offers. Voucher discounts, a form of discounted initial pricing, may encourage consumers to try experience goods they otherwise would have ignored. However, we identify this effect in a setting without asymmetric information regarding merchant quality-consumer heterogeneity, not information asymmetries, drives our main results.
4 Additionally, our work differs from the classical literature on the advertisement of experience goods, as advertising in our setting serves the purpose of awareness, rather than signaling.
5
A substantial literature has observed that selective discounting provides opportunities for price discrimination. In the settings of Varian (1980) , Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985) , and Narasimhan (1988) , for example, merchants engage in sale pricing in order to attract larger market segments.
6 Similar results have been found to motivate the use of cents-off coupons, certificates which promise discounts on repeat (rather than initial) purchases (Cremer (1984) ; Narasimhan (1984) ). We bring the insights of the literature on saledriven price discrimination to bear on voucher discounting-a new "sale" technology. Like the price-theoretic literature which precedes our work, we find that price discrimination depends crucially upon the presence of significant consumer heterogeneity.
Although our work is theoretical, perhaps most central for an empirical comparison of our work to its antecedents is the observation that the prior theoretical literature, including the articles discussed above, has considered only marginal pricing decisions. The previous work on experience goods and price discrimination does not consider deep discounts of the magnitudes now offered by voucher services.
Model
Offering a voucher through Groupon has two potential advantages: price discrimination and advertising. We present a simple model in which a continuum of consumers have the opportunity to buy products from a single firm. The consumers are drawn from two populations, one of which can be targeted by voucher discount offers. First, in Section 3.1, we consider the case in which all consumers are aware of the firm and vouchers serve only to facilitate price discrimination. Then, in Section 3.2, we introduce advertising effects. We present comparative statics in Section 3.3.
Our model has two periods, and the firm ex ante commits to a price p for both periods. The firm and consumers share a common discount factor δ. Following the setup of Bils (1989) , consumers share a common probability r that the firm's product is a "fit." Conditional on fit, the valuation of a consumer i for the firm's offering is v i .
A consumer i purchases in the first period if either the single-period value, rv i − p, or the expected discounted future value,
For δ > 0, there is an informational value to visiting in the first period: if a consumer learns that the firm's product is a fit, then the consumer knows to return. As a result, all consumers with values at least
To consider the effects of offering discounts to a subset of consumers, we assume there are two distinct consumer populations. Proportion λ of consumers have valuations drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function G, while proportion 1 − λ have valuations drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function F . We denote by V ≡ supp(F ) ∪ supp(G) the set of possible consumer valuations. We assume that G(v) ≥ F (v) for all v ∈ V , i.e. that the valuations of consumers in the G population are systematically lower than those of consumers in the F population.
The firm faces demand
in the first period, and fraction r of those consumers return in the second period. The firm maximizes profits π given by
where c is the firm's marginal cost. The first-order condition of the firm's optimization problem is
where p * is the optimal price and v * ≡ v(p * ). We assume that the distribution of consumers is such that profits are single-peaked, so that p * is uniquely defined.
Discount Vouchers
After setting its optimal price p * , the firm is given the opportunity to offer a discount voucher.
7 Only fraction γ of consumers in the G population have access to the discount voucher system. (Consumers in the F population cannot buy vouchers.) Through the voucher system, these consumers have the opportunity to purchase from the firm at a discounted price αp in the first period. If α > r, then everyone who purchases in the first period will return if the firm is a fit; the minimal valuation of consumers who purchase is
If α < r, then some consumers i with v i < p will purchase in the first period but will not return (even if the firm is a fit). Those will be the consumers i for whom
The voucher service retains proportion 1 − β of the voucher sales price, so the firm's revenue from each discount voucher is αβp * . Definingṽ ≡ṽ(p * ) andv ≡ α r p * , we see that offering discount vouchers yields the following change in profits:
The first term of (2) represents the increased profits from the gain in consumers G(v * ) − G(ṽ); the second term measures profits lost by lowering the first-period price from p * to αβp * . Note that γ affects the magnitude of the change in profits, but not the sign.
8 The following result is therefore immediate.
Proposition 1. If it is profitable to offer the voucher discount to one consumer (randomly drawn from the G population), then it is more profitable to offer the voucher discount to all such consumers.
When α = 1, introducing the discount voucher does not affect consumers' purchase decisions (v * =ṽ), as consumers are offered no actual "discount." 9 Meanwhile, if consumers who use discount vouchers have the same distribution of valuations as other consumers (F (v) = G(v) for all v), then the first-and second-order conditions show that the change in profits is maximal at α = 1, so if α < 1 then vouchers are unprofitable. Conversely, if the distributions of valuations are well behaved and G is to the left of F , then there is some α < 1 such that offering a discounted price of αp ≥ αp can be profitable. This is because the firm wants to offer a lower price to consumers from the G population; setting α < 1 brings the firm's price to the G population closer to the optimal price for that population.
We formalize these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If F (v) = G(v) for all v and min{α, β} < 1, then the introduction of a discount voucher yields a decrease in profit. By contrast, if
then there is some α < 1 such that offering a discount voucher with discounted price of αp * ≥ αp * is profitable, so long as β is sufficiently close to 1.
The conditions of Proposition 2 are sufficient for the result, but not necessary. Indeed, whenever F and G are such that the firm's optimal price for consumers from the G population is lower than the firm's optimal price for the combined distribution of consumers, there are some α, β < 1 for which the discount voucher is profitable.
Advertising Effects
In addition to offering consumers discounts, vouchers may also serve to inform consumers about the existence and details of affiliated firms.
We suppose that fraction κ of consumers know about a participating firm, but fraction 1 − κ do not. The uninformed consumers may have high valuations for the firm's product (conditional on learning about the firm), but they cannot purchase without first being informed of the firm's existence.
If the probability of knowing about a firm is constant across consumers (independent of valuations), then a firm's profits absent an online voucher are given by π κ (p * ) ≡ κπ(p * ); the optimal price p * is unchanged from that defined by (1). In that case, if a firm offers a voucher, then all consumers receiving the voucher learn of the firm's existence. The implied change in profits is:
Because uninformed consumers do not purchase absent the voucher, no profits are foregone by offering those consumers discounted pricing. Thus, so long as the discount is not so big that losses in the first period outweigh gains in the second period, the second term in (3) is positive. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this to occur is that the firm's per-voucher revenue is larger than its marginal cost:
This condition (4) is not sufficient for voucher profitability absent the advertising effectit does not guarantee that ∆π(p * ) is positive. However with advertising, as long as condition (4) holds, vouchers are always profitable for "sufficiently unknown" firms as there is always some κ > 0 such that the second term of (3) dominates the first.
Proposition 3. Suppose that αβp * ≥ c. Then, there exists someκ > 0 such that offering vouchers is profitable whenever κ <κ.
Unlike in the pure price discrimination case, when vouchers provide advertising benefits the effect of the difference between the distributions of valuations on the profitability of vouchers is ambiguous. For a fixed p * , the additional profits from advertising are higher when the valuations drawn from G(v) are higher (smaller difference between distributions). However, changing G(v) changes p * , so that the net effect of changing G depends on the shapes of F and G.
Example Comparative Statics
To obtain closed-form comparative statics, we consider the case where valuations are uniformly distributed in each population, but the population means vary:
Here, µ parameterizes the difference between the two distributions: it measures the amount that G(v) is "shifted to the left" relative to F (v). For F and G so defined, the optimal price p * is given by:
In this expression, (1 − λµ)r = ((1 − λ) · 1 + λ · (1 − µ))r is the weighted average of the maximal valuations of the two consumer populations. The multiplicative factor 1+δ 1+δr
represents the premium consumers are willing to pay because of the information value of purchasing in the first period. For simplicity, we consider the case in which β = 1 (the voucher vendor charges no fee), α > r (the proportion of the price paid with the voucher is greater than the probability of fit), and κ = 1 (there are no advertising effects). With these assumptions, the minimum difference between the distributions necessary for a discount voucher to be profitable, denoted µ, is given by
.
The comparative statics of µ are intuitive.
• Patience: The change in firm profits increases in δ, the discount factor, while µ decreases in δ. This is consistent with the interpretation that discount vouchers let a firm accept losses (decreased profits) in the short run in exchange for increased profits in the future, a benefit more valuable to patient firms.
• Costs: Increased marginal costs lower the change in profits and raise the threshold for profitability. Since offering a discount voucher increases quantity sold and decreases per-unit price, it is more profitable for firms with lower marginal costs.
• Population share: If many consumers come from the low-value population (i.e. if λ is high), then it is difficult for the voucher service to be profitable for firms. When λ is high, voucher users' valuations significantly affect the base price p * so that, for a given α, price discrimination is less profitable.
• Discounted price: Although the effect of α on the change in profits is ambiguous, increasing α unambiguously decreases the threshold µ. This is intuitive, as the less of a price decrease the voucher represents, the less heterogeneity across populations is required in order for the discounted voucher to be profitable.
• Probability of fit: Like with α, the effect of a higher probability of fit r on the change in profits is unclear, but increasing r unambiguously lowers µ.
Extensions

The Possibility that Consumers Might Purchase Multiple Vouchers
So far we have assumed that each consumer can purchase at most one voucher, a restriction which lets us model the discounted price αp * as being available only in the first period. However, if consumers can buy multiple discount vouchers, then they can enjoy the discounted price in both periods.
If all discount vouchers must be purchased in the first period (as is the case with Groupon and similar voucher vendors), then a consumer i with valuation v i only finds it profitable to buy a second voucher if the expected value of second-period consumption is greater than the present voucher cost, that is, if
Consumers with valuations
p] buy a discount voucher and do not return. Consumers with v i ∈ [ α rδ p, p] only return if they can buy two vouchers (and the firm is a match). Consumers with v i > p return whenever the firm's product is a match.
The profits in the first period are the same as when consumers only purchase a single discount voucher. However, if consumers are able to purchase multiple discount vouchers, then some consumers who would normally return at full price instead return with a second voucher. It follows that allowing consumers to purchase multiple discount vouchers is only profitable if the firm seeks to offer starkly different prices to the two consumer populations.
The profits from allowing the purchase of a second voucher are negative at α = 0, so if they are positive for some α and β they must cross zero at intermediate values of α , β . Since the profits from allowing the second voucher are lower than the profits from initially offering a voucher, it will still be profitable to offer a single voucher at those intermediate values.
The Possibility that the Firm Might Re-optimize Its Prices
If the firm can adjust its posted prices to account for the presence of discount vouchers, then the firm will re-optimize to set a new pricep * maximizing
Pricing atp * raises the profits from a discount voucher promotion and lowers the required minimum difference between distributions required for voucher profitability. The prospect of adjusting prices places new importance on γ: the sign of the change in profits now depends on γ because the proportion of consumers receiving the discounted price affects the firm's re-optimization.
Even with the opportunity of price re-optimization, discount vouchers are not profitable when the two populations are identical (F (v) = G(v) for all v). Under the assumptions of Section 3.3, for λ sufficiently large, µ is decreasing in γ. In this case the firm would prefer to set different prices for the two consumer populations, it can do this more effectively when more of the G consumers may acquire vouchers (i.e. when γ is large). When γ is low, the firm is limited in the extent to which it can raise the price faced by consumers from the F population because many G-population consumers face the same price.
Discussion
Implications for Merchants
Our results offer practical advice for firms considering whether to offer discount vouchers. Our discussion in Section 4.1 indicates that a firm might want to disallow purchase of multiple discount vouchers. But as argued by Friedman and Resnick (2001) , firms face substantial practical difficulties in implementing this restriction. What stops consumers from creating multiple accounts and purchasing one voucher through each such account?
To date, it appears that few firms have adjusted prices in anticipation of many consumers using discount vouchers. However, we did notice a sharp price increases at one local restaurant that offers frequent discounts through discount voucher services. Visiting this restaurant, our experience has been that at least half of consumers come bearing discount vouchers. Vouchers have noticeably increased the restaurant's traffic, yet at prices (net of voucher services' fees, even bearing in mind the price increase) that surely reduce the restaurant's margins. We doubt the restaurant would have enjoyed a similar traffic increase had it simply lowered its prices 25%; clearly vouchers play an important role in making consumers aware of discounts. Yet with voucher services retaining as much as half the consumer's prepayment, heavy reliance on discount voucher marketing comes at a significant cost.
Firms would do well to assess whether their voucher-using customers have already visited and previously paid full price. Firms should also measure how many voucherusing customers later come back without vouchers. In principle, credit card systems could track this information with little harm to customer privacy or data security. But in practice, most firms currently lack the tools or expertise to run such analyses.
The Future of Voucher Services
Our model reveals that a discount voucher service is more likely to be profitable for affiliated firms, all else equal, if customers using that service have valuations substantially different from (and in particular, below) those of other customers. But notice the difficulty as the voucher service grows: As more consumers use vouchers, voucher-users necessarily come to resemble average consumers, so the use of a voucher comes to convey less information about a consumer's valuation. Thus, as voucher services grow, their affiliates will have to rely on voucher advertising rather than voucher price discrimination. Current voucher services' profits and recent growth may therefore not be good predictors of those services' future values.
Meanwhile, we are struck by the large fees that leading discount voucher services currently charge to participating firms. Groupon charges 50% of voucher price: if a restaurant offers a $20 voucher for $40 of food, Groupon retains $10-a large fee relative to Groupon's marginal costs of voucher provision (Groupon (2010) ). As our results in Section 3.1 indicate, such large fees may impede firms' usage of discount vouchers. However, competition among discount voucher services may drive down these fees.
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Recently, Groupon has begun to unbundle some of its services. As of December, 2010, Groupon is charging just 10% to a firm which only wants its offer to appear following user searches, while continuing to require the 50% fee for Groupon's traditional service of featuring a merchant in a daily email to all consumers in a given city (Groupon (2010) ). On one view, the 10% fee might look like a bargain to firms-10% is certainly far less than 50%. However, if Groupon's low-priced service only gives a firm access to consumers who already know about that firm, then it provides no advertising opportunities-only price discrimination.
